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On the Power of Simple Branch Prediction Analysis |
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Source: Cryptology ePrint Archives - Posted by Eric Lubow
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Deep CPU pipelines paired with the CPU’s ability to fetch and issue multiple instructions at every machine cycle led to the concept of superscalar processors. Superscalar processors admit a theoretical or best-case performance of less than 1 machine cycle per completed instructions, cf. [She]. However, the inevitably required branch instructions in the underlying machine languages were very soon recognized as one of the most painful performance killers of superscalar processors. Not surprisingly, CPU architects quickly invented the concept of branch predictors in order to circumvent those performance bottlenecks. Thus, it is not surprising that there has been a vibrant and very practical research on more and more sophisticated branch prediction mechanisms, cf. [PH,Sha,She]. Unfortunately, a very recent paper, cf. [ASK], identified branch prediction as a novel and unforeseen side-channel, thus being another new security threat within the computer security field. Let us elaborate a little bit on this connection between side-channel attacks and modern computer-architecture ingredients.
So far, typical targets of side-channel attacks have been mainly Smart Cards, cf. [CNK,Koc]. This is due to the ease of applying such attacks to smart cards. The measurements of sidechannel information on smart cards are almost “noiseless”, which makes such attacks very practical. On the other side, there are many factors that affect such measurements on real commodity computer systems based upon the most successful one, the Intel x86-architecture, cf. [Sha]. These factors create noise, and therefore it is much more difficult to develop and perform successful attacks on such “real” computers within our daily life. Thus, until very recently, the vulnerability of systems even running on servers was not “really” considered to be harmful by such side-channel attacks. This was changed with the work of Brumley and Boneh, cf. [BB], who demonstrated a remote timing attack over a real local network. They simply adapted the attack principle as introduced in [Sch] to show that the RSA implementation of OpenSSL [open] — the most widely used open source crypto library — was not immune to such attacks.
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